How on earth did Libya find itself in that most unenviable of situations? There are several explanations that have been put forward to answer that question, with some being more convincing than others. The knee-jerk reaction to Libya’s current schizophrenia is to lay the blame for the country’s mess at the door of those Western countries which had intervened on the side of Libya’s anti-Qaddafi forces starting from March 2011.
There are two different arguments here against that intervention: The first centres on the claim that Qaddafi ought to have been left alone to deal with his country’s uprising even if that meant that he would do so with an iron fist. This argument suggests that no matter how tyrannical Qaddafi was, he was nevertheless less of an evil than the Islamists or- even worse- a state of anarchy would be; the second of those two arguments revolves around the assertion that, yes, Western intervention was necessary to prevent a large-scale massacre from taking place in the city of Benghazi, but that Western powers should have exerted more pressure- forcefully, if need be- in order to help Libya get back on its feet. Others, however, have pointed out that Libya’s chaos is the inevitable legacy of forty two years of brutal dictatorship that had systematically vitiated and marginalized that country’s political and administrative machinery, relying instead almost entirely on Qaddafi’s own personal whims and quirks which, once out of the picture, had brought about Libya’s demise. Still others have pointed to the country’s mostly Arabic and Islamic political culture, adding that the Middle East’s long history of dictatorship, tyranny, totalitarianism, and violence could not have been undone in weeks or months; that those were, in fact, deep underlying factors which aggravated Libya’s political underdevelopment and which- unless overcome- would lead to further violence and instability. In addition to the aforementioned attempts at explaining Libya’s maelstrom, other views have been advanced concerning internal contradictions within Libya’s national identity itself: Those point to factors such as the great schism between secularists and Islamists, the historical regional tensions between the eastern and westerns parts of the country, the differences between the urbanites and the Bedouins, and the conflicts between one tribe and another vying to exert more political control and enjoy more access to Libya’s huge natural resources.
There is undoubtedly some merit in most of the above-mentioned arguments. It is no secret that the Middle East’s long history of tyranny and its totalitarian political culture have been key factors in that region’s contemporary trials and tribulations. Just to illustrate this with some modern examples: Out of the five most constitutional governments that have arisen in the Middle East in the past 75 years, only one survived military coups d’état- that of Tunisia’s Al-Habib Bourguiba; by contrast, Syria’s constitutional government was overthrown in 1949; Egypt’s in 1952; Iraq’s in 1958; and Libya’s in 1969. The new military dictatorships in those four countries initially enjoyed massive support from their respective populations as well as active assistance from the United States, something which ensured the success of their misadventures. The history of each of those four countries has since been nothing short of a downward spiral towards a bottomless pit, Libya’s included.
Another reason for Libya’s current state of anarchy is Qaddafi’s methodical, long-term destruction of any viable state institutions in that country, something which has inflicted such extensive and profound damage that- once he was dead- Libya was caught in an endless merry-go-round. This is the scenario that Western powers should have foreseen and fully appreciated; instead, following France’s and Britain’s justifiable intervention in Libya’s war, those two countries left matters for Libyans to sort out. There are, to be sure, some mitigating factors that could somewhat soften one’s criticism of the way the post-Qaddafi period was handled by the intervening Western countries: Abysmal failure in the Iraq War of 2003 had made Western countries extremely wary of foreign interventions; the Libyans’ strong aversion to foreigners interfering in their own internal affairs was also a factor to be reckoned with; and the Libyans’ seemingly infectious enthusiasm at that time for liberty and tolerance appeared to nudge foreign observers towards the idea of leaving the reins of Libya’s governance in Libyan hands. Some Western politicians, such as Britain’s then Foreign Secretary William Hague, have since said that there was an abundance of post-Qaddafi plans, but that Western countries did not have the power to implement them, nor was there a strong Libyan authority in a position to execute them. Mr. Hague has also indicated that the ill-advised rush to democracy was instigated by the Libyan leaders themselves, not by Western powers. He added that poor governance, religious hatred, lack of economic development, and a growing young population have made things worse for Libya. All the same, one is inclined to think that Western powers ought to have foreseen the potential emergence of such an unpleasant scenario in Libya and they should have acted accordingly; instead, things were left to chance in the false hope that Libya could somehow manage to pull through the crisis on its own.
The above-mentioned failure to have a clear vision, think well in advance, know where and how one is going, and act decisively on it has been repeated in the West’s reaction to the increasing growth of the Islamic State group (IS) in Libya. The June 2014 elections in Libya saw a massive defeat for Islamists. A new parliament, the internationally-recognized House of Representatives, was to replace the older parliament, the GNC, whose term had expired in February of that same year. It was not to be. In August 2014, Libya Dawn, an agglomeration of mostly Misratan Islamists and non-Islamists, took control of Tripoli and forced the recently-elected House of Representatives to flee to the eastern city of Tobruk. Shortly thereafter, the GNC was resuscitated, brought back into action, and stacked with new, largely Islamist members. From that moment onwards, Libya developed two governments, two parliaments, two national oil companies, and two central banks. Between 2014 and 2016, Islamists- who had witnessed how their own fellow countrymen had rejected them at the ballot box- resorted to an open rebellion aimed at seizing power by force. They upped the ante by intensifying their campaign of assassinations, kidnappings, and indiscriminate acts of violence. It was not long before Al-Qaeda started to have a significant impact on Libya’s political life, followed very shortly thereafter by the rise of the Islamic State group (IS) in Libya. More violence and acts of brutality by the Islamists were to follow.